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Abstract
This article examines a model of competition between two types of health insurer: Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) and nonintegrated insurers. HMOs vertically integrate health care providers and pay them at a competitive
price, while nonintegrated health insurers work as indemnity plans and pay the health care providers freely chosen by
policyholders at a wholesale price. Such difference is referred to as an input price effect which, at first glance, favors
HMOs. Moreover, we assume that policyholders place a positive value on the provider diversity supplied by their
health insurance plan and that this value increases with the probability of disease. Due to the restricted choice of
health care providers in HMOs a risk segmentation occurs: policyholders who choose nonintegrated health insurers
are characterized by higher risk, which also tends to favor HMOs. Our equilibrium analysis reveals that the equilibrium
allocation only depends on the number of HMOs in the case of exclusivity contracts between HMOs and providers.
Surprisingly, our model shows that the interplay between risk segmentation and input price effects may generate
ambiguous results. More precisely, we reveal that vertical integration in health insurance markets may decrease health
insurers’ premiums.
Jel Classification: L42 and I11
Keywords: Vertical integration, Health maintenance organizations, Competition policy
Background
Even though few articles analyze the consequences of
vertical integration in the health insurance sector in the-
oretical terms,1 vertical integration is often presented as
an efficient remedy for reducing or containing increasing
health care expenditures. First, vertical integration allows
insurers to reduce providers’ moral hazard and transac-
tion costs. Second, as pointed out in Cutler,McClellan and
Newhouse [1] and Melnick et al. [2] Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) negotiate lower prices with health
care providers. Third, in the US context, HMO pene-
tration has been associated with increased competition
in the health insurance sector [3]. However, in spite of
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these optimistic views it is known that vertical integration
can lead to anti-competitive situations [4]. More precisely,
vertical integration may create incentives for foreclu-
sion, increase providers’ (upstream) market concentration
and consequently raise the input prices for nonintegrated
insurers (downstream firms): the so-called “raise rivals’
cost” effect [5]. In the health insurance sector vertical
integration may also generate risk segmentation among
policyholders. Indeed, policyholders value the diversity
of the health care providers that their health insurance
plan provides and this value naturally increases with the
probability of disease. Roughly speaking, policyholders
characterized by a high probability of disease tend to
prefer to be affiliated with nonintegrated health insur-
ance companies that do not restrict their choice of health
care provider.2
From an empirical perspective, it is difficult to disentan-
gle these effects and, in particular, to understand if HMOs’
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lower costs are due to risk segmentation, a raise rivals’
cost effect, or to the previously mentioned positive argu-
ments. At this stage of the analysis it is worth noting that
when taken separately the raise rivals’ cost effect and the
risk segmentation effect work in the same direction and
should yield an increase in premiums charged by noninte-
grated health insurance companies. The goal of this article
is to understand the interplay between these two effects,
which can yield ambiguous results, as will be shown
later on.
In this article, we provide a simple theoretical model in
order to analyze how the number of HMOs affects the
premiums charged by nonintegrated health insurers. We
use the traditional framework of vertical integration pro-
vided by Salinger [6] to model competition where many
HMOs and many nonintegrated health insurance com-
panies participate. More precisely, policyholders choose
between nonintegrated health insurance companies and
HMOs and we assume perfect competition within the
nonintegrated health insurers market, as well as within the
HMOs market. Moreover, we consider that both markets
are submitted to a community rating regulation. There-
fore, insurers have to charge premiums according to the
average risk of their policyholders, yielding a regulatory
adverse selection [7].
Due to the perfect competition assumption, at equi-
librium both types of insurer contract, i.e. nonintegrated
health insurers and HMOs contracts, are charged at their
respective marginal costs. Nevertheless, the marginal
costs of nonintegrated health insurers and HMOs differ
in two respects: the price paid to health care providers,
which may involve a raise rivals’ cost effect, and the
average health risk of their respective policyholders, i.e.
the adverse selection due to the risk segmentation men-
tioned above. Concerning the first difference and fol-
lowing Salinger [6], we suppose that vertical integration
allows HMOs to pay for the health care delivered by
affiliated providers at their marginal cost, whereas nonin-
tegrated health insurance companies have to pay a whole-
sale price to health care providers, which is by nature
higher than the marginal cost. To capture the second
difference we add an endogenous risk segmentation to
Salinger’s framework between nonintegrated health insur-
ance companies and HMOs. Ceteris paribus, policyhold-
ers with a higher risk of disease prefer to be insured
with nonintegrated health insurance companies that do
not restrict access to health care providers. Roughly
speaking, this risk segmentation generates an adverse
selection phenomenon since nonintegrated insurers’ pol-
icyholders are characterized by a higher probability of
falling ill.
Following Salinger [6], we consider an exogenous mar-
ket structure and provide some comparative static anal-
yses in order to focus on the effects of the number
of HMOs on health insurance premiums (nonintegrated
health insurance companies and HMOs’ premiums).3 Our
model attempts to understand the interplay between risk
segmentation and health care price effects. First, we show
that the number of HMOs affects the equilibrium allo-
cation only when HMOs and providers form exclusive
contracts since vertical integration increases concentra-
tion in the providers’ market, i.e. fewer providers are
available for policyholders who choose nonintegrated
insurers. Second, without assuming that the presence
of HMOs increases competitive pressure in the health
insurance market, our results show that the penetra-
tion of HMOs can, in some cases, reduce noninte-
grated insurers as well as HMOs’ premiums. The model
allows us to determine that the level of health care
marginal cost constitutes a key factor in vertical integra-
tion welfare consequences for health insurance markets.
This result departs from Gaynor and Ma (Gaynor, M
and Ma, A: Insurance, vertical restraints, and competi-
tion, unpublished), who show that the reduced choice
implied by exclusive contracts is detrimental to consumer
surplus.
The game between health insurers and health care
providers has already been thoroughly analyzed in
(Gaynor, M and Ma, A: Insurance, vertical restraints, and
competition, unpublished), Ma [8], Gal-Or [9, 10] and,
more recently in Douven et al. [11] and Bardey and Bour-
geon [12]. These articles endogenously determine the
nature of the contracts that emerge at an equilibrium
between hospitals and health insurers, but they rule out
the risk segmentation effect. In contrast, we introduce
a risk segmentation effect and take the type of contract
as well as the market structure to be exogenous. Bardey
and Rochet [13] take into account some risk segmentation
but they apply it to the competition between HMOs and
PPOs, assuming that PPOs provide a bigger network. Dif-
ferently, our analysis does not really distinguish between
HMOs and PPOs but focuses on risk segmentation and
its consequences for, and interplay with, the raise rivals’
cost effect. We claim that our result may contribute to
an explanation of the contrasting results provided in the
empirical literature. In particular, we do not need the tra-
ditional positive positive arguments usually attributed to
HMOs - such as that of the implementation of non-price
rationing strategies to reduce providers’ moral hazard or
an increase of competition in health insurance market - to
exhibit that HMOs competition may contribute to lower
nonintegrated insurers’ premiums and therefore tends to
reduce HMOs’ marginal cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. “The
model” section presents the model. “Equilibrium analysis”
section gives the outcome of the equilibrium and its
properties are discussed. We conclude in “Discussion and
conclusions” section.
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Themodel
This section presents the theoretical model that contains
two sets of health insurance companies: HMOs and non-
integrated.
The health insurance companies
In our model there are many nonintegrated health insur-
ance companies, as well as many HMOs. We note n the
number of HMOs among insurance companies (as we
shall see later on, the number of nonintegrated health
insurance companies does not matter). The difference
between nonintegrated health insurance companies and
HMOs is that the latter offer a restricted list of providers
to policyholders, while the former allow policyholders to
freely choose among the providers available in the health
care market. For the purposes of simplicity, we assume
that policyholders who choose HMOs can only obtain
care from one provider (who belongs to this HMO).More-
over, we assume that nonintegrated insurers and HMOs
do not bear any costs other than the price of the health
care they pay to providers. We note R and r the price
paid to providers by nonintegrated insurers and HMOs,
respectively. Nonintegrated health insurance companies
charge a premium PCI to policyholders, and HMOs a pre-
mium PHMO. We assume perfect competition between
nonintegrated health insurance companies, i.e. they sell
their health insurance contract at a marginal cost. The
same assumption is applied to HMOs.4 Moreover, it is
worth noticing that nonintegrated health insurance com-
panies and HMOs’ marginal costs both depend on the
average risk of the policyholders who choose the insur-
ance plans on the one hand, and on the price paid to
providers on the other.
The providers
Throughout the paper, we consider that the market struc-
ture defined by the number of HMOs and providers is
exogenous. This assumption allows us to perform com-
parative static exercises with respect to the number of
HMOs in order to shed light on the effect of vertical inte-
gration in health care markets.5 We denote by J providers
who offer health care to patients. We suppose that each
provider bears a constant marginal cost, noted as c. We
consider a situation where HMOs sign exclusive con-
tracts with providers; that is, a provider who works for
an HMO cannot supply health care to patients who are
not affiliated with that HMO. Consequently, for a given
number of providers the prevalence of exclusive contracts
reduces the diversity of providers available to policyhold-
ers who choose nonintegrated health insurance compa-
nies. Hence, since we have nHMOs and each HMO offers
access to one provider, this implies that policyholders
who choose nonintegrated health insurance companies
have access to K = J − n providers when they fall ill.
Moreover, for simplicity, we consider a situation of single-
homing in which providers affiliated with an HMO can-
not offer health care to patients insured through another
insurance company. By contrast, when vertical integration
does not involve exclusive contracts, i.e. non-exclusive
contracts are formed between HMOs and providers, then
the number of providers available to patients affiliated
with nonintegrated health insurance companies remains
K = J . In other words, in such a case even providers who
belong to HMOs are available to nonintegrated insurers’
policyholders.
Following Salinger [6], exclusive contracts between
HMOs and affiliated providers lead to a crucial differ-
ence between both types of insurance plan. Nonintegrated
health insurance companies pay providers for health care
at a wholesale price R that includes a markup based on c,
whereas HMOs, thanks to their vertical structure, obtain
health care at marginal cost c, that is r = c.6 Finally, we
consider competition between the independent providers
using a circular location model. We normalize the length
of the circle to 1 and we note provider i’s location by
xi ∈ {1, . . . , J − n}, where J − n providers are located at an
equal distance from one another.
The policyholders
We assume that policyholders can only obtain health care
when they become ill by purchasing a health insurance
contract. We assume that policyholders benefit from full
insurance coverage and do not pay any out-of-pocket
expenses. Following Gal-Or [9, 10], we assume that poli-
cyholders are differentiated according to two dimensions.
The first of these is an ex ante distribution of their proba-
bility of disease, noted by θ , which is uniformly distributed
over [0, 1] and corresponds with the probability of health
care consumption. The second dimension is an ex post
uniform distribution over a circle of length 1 that reflects
the type of disease that affects policyholders when they
become ill. The ex post address of policyholders is noted
by x, and we assume a linear transportation cost, noted
t. This ex post differentiation captures the following idea:
when policyholders choose their health insurer (noninte-
grated health insurance company or HMO) they do not
know ex ante which kind of disease they will suffer from
if they become ill and, consequently, do not know which
is the best provider for treating their disease. This ex
post differentiation can be interpreted as a preference for
diversity under the veil of ignorance and yields a vertical
differentiation according to the type of health insurer cho-
sen. Roughly speaking, policyholders characterized by a
high probability of being sick, ceteris paribus, prefer non-
integrated health insurance companies rather than HMOs
due to the diversity of providers to which they have access
via the former. Patients may bear a higher expected trans-
portation cost by being insured with an HMO because
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the provider to which they have access is not necessar-
ily the most suitable according to the disease captured
by their address x. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that ex ante and ex post distributions are independent.
The probability θ , which is supposed to be observable by
insurers, is the key parameter that determines the risk seg-
mentation among policyholders among both HMOs and
nonintegrated health insurance companies.
The policyholders’ expected utility function can be
written:
U = u + 2θy
∫ 1/2y
0
(v − tx)dx − P. (1)
The first term of the utility function represents the gross
utility that an individual can obtain without an insurance
plan. It can be viewed as the expected utility that an indi-
vidual can obtain in the absence of insurance. The second
term measures the benefit that a policyholder character-
ized by a probability θ derives from the insurance plan.
Thanks to their plan, when they become ill they ben-
efit from health care that gives a utility v, minus the
expected transportation cost according to the provider
they are allowed to choose. This expected transportation
cost mainly depends on the number y of providers accessi-
ble and the probability of disease θ . Finally, policyholders
have to pay a premium P to be insured.7
Remember that policyholders have access to only one
provider if they choose an HMO (y = 1) and to K = J − n
when they are insured by a nonintegrated health insurance
company. Consequently, the expected utilities for policy-
holders affiliated with a nonintegrated health insurance
company and an HMO are respectively:
UCI (θ) = u + 2θK
∫ 1/2(J−n)
0
(v − tx)dx − PCI (2)
and,
UHMO (θ) = u + 2θ
∫ 1/2
0
(v − tx)dx − PHMO, (3)
where PCI and PHMO denote the premium charged by
nonintegrated health insurance companies and HMOs,
respectively.
Hence given a probability of disease θ , a policyholder
prefers to buy a health insurance contract from a nonin-
tegrated health insurance company rather than from an
HMO if
UCI (θ) ≥ UHMO (θ) . (4)
Let us denote as θ˜ the marginal policyholder indiffer-
ent to the two types of health insurance plan. So the last
inequality applies if and only if
θ ≥ θ˜ = (PCI − PHMO) 4Kt (K − 1) . (5)
A policyholder with a higher probability of disease than
θ˜ prefers to choose a nonintegrated health insurance
company in order to enable choice of provider if they
become ill, even if they have to pay a higher premium.
We can observe that θ˜ decreases with K and consequently
increases in n. In other words, at this stage of the game
nonintegrated health insurance companies obtain a higher
market share when they provide a greater diversity of
providers, i.e. 1− θ˜ increases. Note that their market share
also increases with t, which is an inverse measure of the
substitutability between the two types of insurance plan.
Equilibrium analysis
We apply the standard sequential game that is used in
the vertical integration literature to characterize the equi-
librium. In the first stage we determine the wholesale
price at the upstream level (the provider market). In the
second stage we derive the equilibrium prices at the down-
stream level (i.e. the insurance sector). The game is solved
backwards.
Downstream competition
At the downstream level insurers compete à la Bertrand.
As already mentioned, we assume a perfect competition
outcome in both markets, the market of nonintegrated
health insurance companies and the market of HMOs.
In other words, we assume perfect competition and that
no-loading factors matter in both health insurance mar-
kets. Moreover, we consider a community rating regime in
which premiums reflect the average risk of policyholders
affiliated with the same type of insurer.8 Therefore, in the








where (1 + θ˜ )/2 represents the average probability of dis-
ease for policyholders who choose nonintegrated insurers,
while R is the price of the health care paid by noninte-
grated insurers to providers.
Ex ante, policyholders do not know their ex post address
(the type of disease they will suffer from if they become
ill), hence when they choose their health insurance con-
tract they have no particular preference for a specific
provider. Behind this veil of ignorance there is no differ-
entiation in the HMOmarket even though the “good” sold
is different from an ex post perspective. Consequently,
HMOs’ premiums are equal to their marginal costs: the
health care marginal cost c, weighted by the average prob-
ability of HMO policyholders (θ˜/2):
PHMO = θ˜2 c. (7)
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The equilibrium in the subgame at the downstream level
can be directly derived from the marginal policyholder
definition and premiums. For a given price R, the health
insurance sector equilibrium is given by:
PCI = 12R
(
1 + 2KR2cK − 2KR + (K − 1)t
)
, (8)
PHMO = cKR2cK − 2KR + (K − 1)t ,
θ˜ = 2KR2cK − 2KR + (K − 1)t .
Remark 1. At this stage both premiums increase in the
wholesale price R.
Ceteris paribus, at the given risk segmentation an
increase in the wholesale price increases the premium
of nonintegrated insurers. Consequently, HMOs become
more attractive, in turn reinforcing the risk segmentation
effect (θ˜ increases in R). Both premiums increase in R.
Upstream competition
Only a fraction (1 − θ˜ ) of policyholders choose their
providers freely. Thus, according to the ex post uniform
distribution address, each provider is actually in a monop-
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where R is the average price paid to providers and θ˜
is given by (8). We have R =
J∑
Rj/K . According to
the uniform distribution of providers, they all obtain
identical market shares. Consequently, the average is a
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1 − θ˜2
2 , (9)


















resents the elasticity of the marginal policyholder with
respect to the average price paid to physicians and R∗
denotes the price charged by providers at the symmetric
equilibrium of this subgame.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the provider markup
directly: 9
i) increases with the number of providers available
for nonintegrated health insurance companies’
policyholders;
ii) decreases with the elasticity of the wholesale price.
Equation (9) looks like the traditional formula obtained
in Cournot’s oligopoly framework in the sense that the
provider markup is inversely related to price elasticity.
Nevertheless, significant differences may be noted. The
first point of Proposition 1 (with respect to the number
of providers) may be interpreted as an induced demand
effect from providers when their control variable is price
and not quantity [14]. When the number of providers
increases, the diversity supplied by nonintegrated health
insurance companies also increases. Ceteris paribus, their
demand function shifts upwards, so the number of poli-
cyholders who can freely choose their provider increases,
thus allowing providers to increase their markup. Actually,
a positive externality occurs between providers due to the
effect on the demand for nonintegrated health insurance
companies. When the marginal policyholder is extremely
price sensitive this demand effect obviously reduces the
providers’ ability to increase their markup.
Proposition 2. If an interior equilibrium occurs, i.e.
θ˜ < 1, the profit of the providers is decreasing with K (is
increasing in n).
Proof. See Appendix.
According to our specifications, Proposition 2 reveals
that the competition effect dominates the markup effect.
We now turn to an analysis of the properties of our
equilibrium.
Properties of the equilibrium
Instead of directly analyzing variations of R and θ˜ with
respect to K, the market share variation of HMOs with










The first term of the RHS is called the diversity effect
and is a direct consequence of risk segmentation. As
described previously, if nonintegrated health insurance
companies supply greater diversity (in terms of providers
available) then the HMOmarket share decreases. The sec-
ond term is the wholesale price effect. It captures the
impact of the health care price paid by nonintegrated
health insurance companies to physicians on the exist-
ing risk segmentation. Hence the higher the price paid by
nonintegrated health insurance companies to providers,
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the higher the premium charged by nonintegrated health
insurance companies to their policyholders and the lower
their market share.
Remark 2. If the HMO market share increases with K,
then R also increases with respect to K (decreases with
respect to n).
As θ˜ decreases with respect to R while the direct effect
means that ∂θ˜/∂K < 0, we have dθ˜/dK > 0, if and only if
∂R/∂K > 0. In the Appendix we define a threshold value
for c, allowing us to give the following Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. The HMO market share increases with
K (decreases with n) if c < c˜.
Proof. See Appendix.
There are two countervailing effects at work: the input
price and diversity (or risk segmentation) effects men-
tioned. In equilibrium, for small values of c, we show
that the HMO market share increases with the number
of physicians available in the market. In other words,
when the health care marginal cost is low enough, instead
of losing market share because the diversity supplied
by nonintegrated health insurance companies increases
and makes them more attractive, HMO market share
increases because providers charge a higher price to non-
integrated health insurance companies who are obliged
to increase premiums for their policyholders. As HMOs
benefit from health care at its marginal cost, the dif-
ference PCI − PHMO increases such that it dominates
the increase of the diversity supplied by conventional
insurers.
Based on Remark 2 and Proposition 3, we can summa-
rize the results obtained in the following corollary:
Corollary 1. For small values of c (i.e. c < c˜), R, PCI and
PHMO are increasing in K and decreasing in n.
Variations of premium PCI become intuitive: In equi-
librium, for small values of c, θ˜ and R increase in K.
As premiums charged by nonintegrated insurers increase
with R and θ˜ , PCI also increases in K and decreases in the
number of HMOs (n). This corollary reveals that when
the level of the health care marginal cost is low enough,
an increase in the number of HMOs (which corresponds
to a decrease in the diversity supplied by nonintegrated
health insurance companies), is ambiguous for policy-
holders welfare. On the one hand, all policyholders pay
lower health insurance premiums when the number of
HMOs increases. On the oher hand, policyholders benefit
from a reduced diversity of providers. Proposition 3 and
corollary 1 thus reveal a trade-off in the case of exclusive
contracts between diversity of providers and the fact that
the markup of providers may decrease with the number
of HMOs (for c < c˜). Actually, competition between
HMOs and nonintegrated health insurance companies
generates two inefficiencies: a wholesale price above the
marginal cost and transportation costs generated by ex
post differentiation.
In the literature that deals with vertical integration the
main issue under analysis is the occurrence of some “raise
rivals’ cost” effects. Since more HMOs reduce the num-
ber of health care providers available, the wholesale price
paid by nonintegrated insurers to providers increases.
This increase in wholesale price increases the noninte-
grated insurers’ marginal cost and thus their premiums.
In our framework the nature of the relationship between
vertical integration and “the rivals’ cost” is different. Ver-
tical integration reduces the number of providers, there-
fore decreasing the diversity generated by nonintegrated
health insurance companies. Nevertheless, for c < c˜, the
reduction in diversity also decreases the wholesale price,
which ceteris paribus reduces the nonintegrated insurers’
marginal costs. Therefore, for a low health care marginal
cost our results are exactly the opposite to the so-called
“raise rivals’ cost” effect. The greater the number of
HMOs the more the nonintegrated health insurance com-
panies’ marginal cost, and consequently their premiums,
decrease.
Concerning the consequences of a contract’s nature, i.e.
exclusive versus non-exclusive contracts, ourmodel allows
us to make the following remark.
Remark 3. The vertical integration in health care mar-
kets does not affect the equilibrium allocation in the case
of non-exclusive contracts between health insurers and
health care providers.
In the case of non-exclusive contracts the number of
providers available in the market remains K = J . Con-
sequently, the number of HMOs (n) does not intervene
in the equilibrium allocation as long as it does not imply
increased competition intensity in the health insurance
market, as is the case in our set-up.
Finally, it is worth highlighting that most of the time the
negative correlation between premiums charged by non-
integrated health insurance companies and HMO pen-
etration is explained by increasing competition in the
health insurance sector [3]. In this article, without tak-
ing into account this possible effect, our results indicate
that the premiums charged by nonintegrated insurers
may decrease with the number of HMOs when they sign
exclusive contracts with providers. Our results also sheds
light on the ambiguous evidence obtained in the litera-
ture about the consequences of vertical integration for the
health sector [15]. Roughly speaking, we point out that
the health care marginal cost may be part of the differ-
ent results obtained by empirical studies that deal with
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vertical integration and exclusive contracts in the health
care sector.
Discussion and conclusions
This model attempts to analyze the impact of vertical
integration in the health insurance sector. As in Gaynor
[15], for health care markets our results indicate that
there is no definitive or unconditional conclusion con-
cerning the consequences of vertical integration in health
insurance markets. Nevertheless, our framework identi-
fies some market structure parameters that can influence
vertical integration consequences in the case of exclusive
contracts between providers and HMOs. More precisely,
our model reveals that the so-called raise rivals’ cost effect
only occurs for a specific range of health care marginal
cost. For smaller values, vertical integration can para-
doxically lead to a reduction in nonintegrated insurers’
premiums.
This model could be extended in several ways. First,
it would be interesting to focus on a situation in which
some of the health insurers are public or not-for-profit
[16]. Second, we assume that the market is covered on
the policyholder side, which is not necessarily the case in
practice. Therefore, our model could be modified to take
into account an uncovered market and to introduce a uni-
versal service issue, as is the case in other sectors [17].
Finally, it is worth noting that even though our set up is
devoted to an analysis of vertical integration in the health
insurance sector, it could be applied to all other sectors
in which vertical restraints imply a reduction in product
diversity and where there exists sufficient heterogeneity
among consumers with respect to diversity valuation. In
such a case, our model should be slightly modified to take
into account the fact that consumer willingness to pay
does not necessarily follow a probability structure.
Endnotes
1See, for instance, the recent review of literature
provided by Gaynor and Town [18].
2Our model takes into account the risk segmentation
that occurs between nonintegrated health insurance
companies and HMOs. The adverse selection is then
directly determined by the risk segmentation at work. In
a two-sided market environment, Bardey and Rochet [12]
consider a general risk distribution function in order to
disentangle more deeply the risk segmentation and the
adverse selection effects.
3Bardey and Bourgeon [12] consider an endogenous
market structure, but they do not tackle the risk
segmentation issue.
4This perfect competition assumption among HMOs
makes sense since HMOs are identical from an ex ante
perspective, even though from an ex post perspective
HMOs are differentiated due to the providers’
differentiation. In other words, before falling ill
policyholders do not have any preferences among
providers.
5See Bardey and Bourgeon [12] for an analysis in which
vertical integration is endogeneous.
6We do not model HMOs’ strategies such that
non-price rationing mechanisms, which allow them to
reduce providers’ moral hazard and therefore their costs.
However, since we assume that HMOs’ marginal cost is
lower than the wholesale price paid by nonintegrated
insurers, we already take this advantage into account in a
reduced form. Practically, the reduction of providers’
moral hazard within HMOs yields a lower marginal cost.
7In the Salop model, the diversity value is measured by:
−2θy1/2y0 txdx = −
θ t
4y .
Since the function −(θ t/4y) is increasing and concave in
y, it is worth to note that this diversity value introduced
in the Salop model can be interpreted as risk aversion
toward transportation cost.
8This assumption is natural according to the large
market share of collective health insurance contracts in
the United States. As pointed out in Handel et al. [19],
the Affordable Care Act removes the ability of insurers to
adjust their premiua according to individual health risk.
9specify that it is a direct effect because K also appears
in θ˜ and in the price elasticity μ.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2





















(K , t, c,R) = −1 + 4K
2R2 (t + K (2c − 2R + t))
(2cK − 2KR + (K − 1)t)3 .
Then the goal of the proof is to sign (K) (the sign of
d/dK being the same). It is worth to notice that for t =
0, we have
(K , t = 0, c,R) = −8cK3 (c − 2R) (c − R) < 0.
Moreover, the function (K , t, c,R) is decreasing in t if
and only if
∂(K , t, c,R)
∂t = 4K
2(1 + K)R2 − 3 (K − 1)
(2cK − 2KR + (K − 1)t)2 ≤ 0.
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In the case of an interior equilibrium we have θ˜ < 1.
Taking into account that
θ˜ = 2KR2cK − 2KR + (K − 1)t ,
we have
θ˜ < 1 ⇔ 2cK − 2KR + (K − 1)t > 2KR
⇔ (2cK − 2KR + (K − 1)t)2 > (2KR)2 .
The previous inequality (with the condition K ≥ 2)
implies that
4K2(1 + K)R2 < 3 (K − 1) (2cK − 2KR + (K − 1)t)2 ,
so that
∂(K , t, c,R)
∂t < 0.
As(K , t = 0, c,R) < 0 and the function(.) is decreas-
ing in t, we have (K , t, c,R) < 0 that prove d/dK < 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
We find some conditions for R to insure that θ increases
with respect toK. We are able to exhibit some values of the
parameters (c, t) for which these conditions are checked in
equilibrium (with R = R∗).
Our proof is performed in two steps. First (Step 1)
we determine the general condition that ensures that the
HMOs’ market share increases with respect to K. Second
(Step 2) we determine the conditions for parameter c such
that θ increases with respect to K. According to (Step 1)
and (Step 2) we can conclude that the HMOmarket share
increases with respect to K if c is sufficiently low.
(Step 1) The marginal policyholder is defined by:
θ˜ = 2KR
(2cK − 2KR + (K − 1)t) . (12)




2Kc + (K − 1)t
(2cK − 2KR + (K − 1)t)2 . (13)
The maximization of each provider’s profit enables us to
determine equilibrium price R∗ which is paid by insurers.
Then using (9), (12) and (13) we obtain R∗ as a function of
K, R∗ = R(K):
R(K) = 6cK
2 + 3tK2 − 3tK − 4cK − H




4c2(K − 2)2K2 + 4cK2 (K2 + K − 2) t + K(K − 1)2(8 + K)t2.
(15)
Let us define the HMO market share as a function of K
and R, θ˜ = θ(K ,R). Then substituting R with R∗ = R(K)
into θ(K ,R∗) we are able to determine the equilibrium
HMO market share as a function of K, θ˜ = θ(K ,R(K)).





















2cK + tK − t . (16)
Denote the function f (R∗, c, t,K) such that:




2cK + tK − t . (17)
Then the condition (16) basically becomes f (R∗, c,
t,K) > 0.
The equilibrium price paid by insurers is given by (14).
Substituting H into (14) and taking the derivative of (14)
with respect to K, we obtain:
R′(K) = 3tK
3c + 2K3t2 − 2c2K3 − 6t2K2 + 6t2K − 2t2 + 4c2K2 − 3cK2t − cKH
4KH (K − 1)2 .
(18)
From (14), by writing H as a function of R, we have:
H = K (−3t − 4c + 6cK + 3tK − 8RK + 8R) . (19)
Combining (19) with (18), (17) becomes:
f (R∗, c, t,K) = N(R
∗)
2H (K − 1)R∗ (cK + tK − t) ,
where
N(R∗) = 16tK (K − 1)2 R∗2 − 2K(
t (K − 1)2 (3t + 4c) − 4c2K2)R∗
+ (K − 1) t((K − 1)2 t2 + 2Kct(K − 1) − 4K2c2)
− 8c3K3.
(20)
Since the denominator of f (R∗, c, t,K) is always positive,
we can focus on the sign of the numerator N(R∗, c, t,K).
(Step 2) At this stage, we study the function N(R) to
determine whether f (R, c, t,K) is positive or not. Due to
the complexity of the expressions, we proceed in two
steps: first, we study the function N with respect to R.
Second, we determine the sign of N at R∗.
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Denote  the discriminant of function N(R) such that
we have:
 = 64c4K6 + 384K4t(K − 1)2c3 + 32K2t2(7K2 − 12K + 2)
(K − 1)2c2 − 32K2t3(K − 1)4c − 4Kt4(7K − 16)(K − 1)4
(21)
Note that for c = 0, the discriminant is negative (for
K > 2) and decreasing with respect to c (i.e.  < 0 and
∂/∂c < 0). Moreover,  is convex with c:
∂2(c)
∂c2 = 64K
2 (7K2 − 12K + 2) (K − 1)2 t2
+ 2304K4 (K − 1)2 ct + 768K6c2 > 0.
We can conclude that there exists a value of c, noted c˜,
such that  = 0 for c = c˜. Then  < 0 if c < c˜ and in this
case N(R) is positive, in particular when R = R∗. We can
then conclude that ∂θ/∂K > 0 if c < c˜.
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